


























Dynamics of Output Growth, Consumption and Physical Capital 
















Department of Economics and Related Studies 
University of York 
Heslington 




On Rationalizable Outcomes in 




Jack Robles, Victoria University of Wellington, 
Makoto Shimoji, University of York 
 On Rationalizable Outcomes in Private-Value
First-Price Discrete Auctions
Jack Robles
School of Economics and Finance
Victoria University of Wellington
Makoto Shimoji




In this paper, we extend the result of Dekel and Wollinsky [4] on rationaliz-
able outcomes in rst-price auctions. Dekel and Wollinsky [4] show that under
certain conditions, each player chooses a unique bid conditional on her valuation.
Their result however depends on the assumption that the number of players is
suciently large (relative to the number of available bids). We rst provide a
dierent set of sucient conditions for the uniqueness result. We then show that
for the independent (possibly asymmetric) private value case, (i) the result holds
if the distributions are such that the inverse hazard rate is suciently high for
each valuation, implying that auctions need not necessarily be large, and (ii) if the
distributions satisfy the conditions of Dekel and Wollinsky [4], they always satisfy
ours.
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11 Introduction
It is standard to use the notion of (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium to analyze rst-price
auctions. Battigalli and Sciniscalchi [1] and Dekel and Wollinsky [4] are the rst studies
which departed from this tradition; they instead use the notion of rationalizability.1
This alllows us to have a larger class of beliefs since they are required to be correct
in equilibrium analyses. Moreover, Dekel and Wollinsky [4] (DW hereafter) show (i)
that under certain conditions, each player has a unique rationalizable bid conditional on
her valuation, and (ii) the conditions are satised for the case where the distributions
are conditionally independent and identical, and the probability of each type is strictly
positive.
Despite their surprising uniqueness result, they have one constraint which could be
unrealistic for certain cases; auctions need to be large. More specically, the (implicit)
assumption in DW is that n, the number of players, is strictly higher than m + 1, the
number of grids for possible bids and valuations, i.e., n > m + 1 (n   1  m + 1).2 Our
goal in this paper is to provide a dierent set of conditions under which (i) the same
uniqueness result is obtained, and (ii) auctions need not necessarily be large.
Our result does not require the assumption of n > m + 1. In addition, for the
independent case, we show that if the inverse hazard rate (the ratio of the probability
density function over the cumulative distribution function, also known as the inverse
Mills ratio) is suciently large for each valuation, the result holds.3 This can be achieved
even if the distributions are asymmetric (with the same support).4 We provide an
example under which the result still holds even if n is small independent of the size
of m. Lastly, we show that for the independent case, if players' beliefs satisfy DW's
conditions, they also satisfy ours.
The intuition behind DW's approach is as follows: Given your valuation v and con-
ditional on the event that v is the highest valuation, if there are other players with
valuation v, bidding the lowest bid among the ones which are rationalizable, b, does not
make sense. This is because the best scenario in which you win is every one else with v
also bids b and the ones with lower valuations choose the bids lower than b. In this case,
1Battigalli and Sciniscalchi [1] consider the continuous case while Dekel and Wollinsky [4] use the
discrete case. See also Cho [2].
2If n > m + 1 does not hold, L2   U2 (DW p.181-182 in Proposition 1) is not well dened.
3Note that the assumption that the inverse hazard rate is high for each valuation excludes the case
where there exists a valuation whose probability is zero.
4The issue of asymmetry has also been analyzed in the literature. See for example Maskin and Riley
[5].
2the winner is drawn with equal probability. The chance of winning is small if there are
too many players with v.
Our approach provides a dierent intuition: Suppose, as in DW, that the valuation
and bid space is a discrete grid and let d be the distance between adjacent points.
Consider the case in which your valuation v is the highest possible valuation and the
second highest valuation is ~ v (v > ~ v). Each player with valuation ^ v  ~ v has a unique
rationalizable bid ^ v   d. In this case, you do not want to make a bid ~ v   d since if it is
likely that there are players with ~ v, they will bid thier only surviving bid, ~ v   d. Thus
there is a chance that you lose. If instead you bid ~ v which is still less than v, you can
guarantee the win.
Note that the intuition for our result does not necessarily require a large number
of players. We need a player's concern that someone else would match her lower bid.
If she believes that the event is very likely, she would choose a higher bid. This belief
is reected by the assumption that the inverse hazard rate is suciently high for the
independent case. The case of large n is needed if players do not have such beliefs.
2 Preliminaries
The following is the set-up of DW which we adopt. Consider a rst-price auction with
the set of players N = f1;:::;ng. We assume n  3.5 Possible valuations are V =
f0;d;2d;:::;1   2d;1   d;1g. By denoting d = 1
m, V contains m + 1 elements where
m  2.6 Each player chooses her bid from V . Following DW, we assume that the various
types of each player can have dierent beliefs regarding the other players' valuations and
strategies. We now introduce the conditions imposed on the set of beliefs we consider.
2.1 Beliefs
Given player i's valuation vi, let pi( j vi) 2 (V n 1) be player i's belief regarding other
players' valuations. We assume that the following two conditions hold for the set of
beliefs we consider:
Condition 1 For each i 2 N,
pi(vj  2d for all j 6= i j 0) > 0; and
pi(vj = 0 for all j 6= i j d) > 0:
5Remember that the arguments in DW implies n > m + 1  3.
6If m = 1, Condition 1 suces.





vj  d for all j 6= i










> pi(vj  (   1)d for all j 6= i j vi):
For the comparison purpose, we provide the conditions in DW below:
DW-1 For any pi( j vi = v),
 pi(vj < v for all j 6= i j vi = v) > 0 for every v > 0, and
 pi(vj = 0 for all j 6= i j vi = 0) > 0.
DW-2 There exists  n such that for any n >  n, i, and v, and any pi( j vi = v),
pi(#fj 6= i s.t. vj = vg  m j vj  v for all j;vi = v) <
1
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Given Condition 2 and
pi(vj  d for all j 6= i j vi)
= pi(vj  (   1)d for all j 6= i j vi) + pi
 
vj  d for all j 6= i








for any vi  2d, we have
pi(vj < vi for all j 6= i j vi) > 0: (2)
This almost replaces DW-1. Since this does not include the cases for vi = 0;d, we have
Condition 1.
Condition 2 assures that a player with valuation vi bids exactly vi   d. The idea
is, at each iteration, to use the bid d to dominate the bid (   1)d for players with
valuations vi > d. Since vi   d < vi   (   1)d, the bid d must have a suciently
larger probability of winning. Note that Condition 2 and (1) imply
pi
 
vj  d for all j 6= i






> pi(vj  (   1)d for all j 6= i j vi): (3)
4In the independent case, this relationship is reected in the requirement that the inverse
hazard rate is suciently high.
Example 1. This example demonstrates that allowing correlations could lead to the
violation of Condition 2. Suppose that there exists player i who believes that, conditional
on her valuation being v, there are only two possible scenarios; (i) the other players have
the same valuation v, and (ii) the other players' valuations are all (weakly) less than
v d and there is exactly one player with valuation v d. She assigns a high probability
to the rst so that DW-2 is not violated. The second scenario, however, implies that
the left-hand side in Condition 2 is zero and hence it does not hold: First, for l = 1, the
associated probability is strictly positive while ( l 1
l+1) = 0. Second, for each l > 1, the
corresponding probability is zero.
We later show that for the case of independent distributions, if the distributions satisfy
the conditions in DW, they also satisfy ours. Hence, the violation of this statement (e.g.,
Example 1 above) can be observed only due to the possibility of correlations.
2.2 Dominance and Rationalizability
Given player i's valuation vi, let qi 2 (V n 1  V n 1) be player i's forecast over her
opponents' valuations and bids.7 Let bi 2 V be player i's bid and b i 2 V n 1 be player
i's opponents' bid prole.
Denition 1 Given the set of bids Uk
i (vi)  V for each i 2 N and vi 2 V , a bid
b0
i 2 Uk
i (vi) strictly dominates bi 2 Uk
i (vi) for type vi if
X
v i;b i




i;b i j v)qi(v i;b i j vi)
for all qi 2 (V n 1  V n 1) such that




b i qi(v i;b i j vi) = pi(v i j vi).
We say that bi 2 Uk
i (vi) is not strictly dominated if there does not exists b0
i 2 Uk
i (vi)
which strictly dominates bi. Let U0
i (vi) = V for each i 2 N and vi 2 V . For each i 2 N






i (vi)jbi is not strictly dominated
	
7The word \forecast" is adopted from Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris [3].
5where k 2 f0;1;2;:::g. The set of iteratively undominated bids for player i with valuation
vi is hence \1
k=0Uk
i (vi).
The notion of strict dominance above is the adaptation of the same notion introduced
by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris [3]. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris [3] introduce the
concept of interim correlated rationalizability (ICR), and show that equivalence of ICR
and iterated strict dominance.8 Although the original denition of Dekel, Fudenberg
and Morris [3] uses mixed strategies, we only consider pure-strategy dominance above.
In addition, we assume that players are risk neutral.
3 Result
As in DW, our proof consists of two parts; we rst identify an upper bound on bids for
each type, and we then identify a lower bound. We show that these two bounds are
identical, implying a unique bid for each type. We follow DW for the determination of
the upper bounds, which is reproduced in Appendix.
Observation 1 For any vi, no bid strictly higher than maxf0;vi  dg survives iterated
dominance.
Note that for vi 2 f0;dg, the only surviving bid is bi = 0.
Given Observation 1, we show that, for each vi  2d, bi = 0 is dominated by bi = d.
First, suppose that for each j 6= i, vj  d, and hence they only choose bj = 0. Then,
bi = d gives a payo of vi d > 0 while bi = 0 gives a payo of vi
n . Since we assume that
n  3, if follows that vi   d > vi
n for any vi  2d.9 If instead there is j 6= i such that
vj > d, then bi = d weakly dominates bi = 0. Condition 2 implies that for any vi  2d,
pi(vj  d for all j 6= i j vi) > 0:
Thus, the former occurs with positive probability, and our claim holds.
Observation 2 For each vi  2d, the set of bids which still survive iterated dominance
is fd;:::;vi   dg.
8Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris [3] dene (i) payo relevant state space, , and (ii) type space
T = (Ti;i)i2N where i represents player i's belief and maps Ti to (T i  ). By letting  = Q
j2N Tj = V n, we utilize the beliefs we discussed above and dene strict dominance with respect
to V n. The set of iteratively undominated strategies we obtain is hence the set of interim correlated
rationalizable strategies.
9(vi   d)  
vi
n = n 1
n vi   d  2
32d   d = 1
3d > 0.
6Note that for vi = 2d, the only surviving bid is bi = d.
We now turn to establishing the unique bid for the remaining types vi  3d. Suppose
that there exists   3 such that for each vi  d, the only remaining bid is maxf0;vi 
dg. For each vi  ( + 1)d, we use bi = d to dominate ~ bi = (   1)d. Obviously,
vi   bi < vi   ~ bi while bi gives a higher chance of winning than ~ bi. We show that the
latter eect dominates the former with any belief satisfying Condition 2, implying that
bi strictly dominates ~ bi for each vi  ( +1)d. We then apply Proposition 1 iteratively.
This demonstrates that for vi  3d, any bi < vi   d is iteratively dominated, leaving
bi = vi   d as the only undominated bid.
Proposition 1 Let   2. Suppose that for each vi  ( + 1)d,
Uk
i (vi) = f(   1)d;:::;vi   dg
while for vi  d is Uk
i (vi) = fmaxfvi d;0gg. Then, for each vi  (+1)d, bi = ( 1)d
is strictly dominated by bi = d.
Proof. Given vi  ( + 1)d, the chance of winning by choosing bi = (   1)d is









9j 6= i s.t. vj  d
(   1)d  bk for all k 6= i

















Likewise, the chance of winning by choosing bi = d is
W[djvi] = pi(vj  d for all j 6= i j vi) + qi
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9j 6= i s.t. vj  ( + 1)d
d  bk for all k 6= i
















It is clear that
W[djvi] > W[(   1)djvi]: (6)
We need to show that, independent of opponents' bids (which still survive iterative
dominance),
(vi   d)W[djvi] > (vi   (   1)d)W[(   1)djvi]:
Given (6), this is hardest to satisfy when vi = ( + 1)d. Hence, it suces to show that
W[djvi]   2W[(   1)djvi] > 0: (7)
7Equation (5) can be rewritten as
W[djvi] = pi(vj  (   1)d for all j 6= i j vi) + pi
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d for all j 6= i
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 + 1)d
d  bk for all k 6= i
















Equation (4) can be rewritten as
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9j 6= i s.t. vj  ( + 1)d
(   1)d  bk for all k 6= i

















It is easy to see that
pi
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   1)djvi]





vj  d for all j 6= i


















9j 6= i s.t. vj  (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8Note that only the last two terms depend on opponents' bids and both are non-negative.
Hence, if Condition 2 holds, which ensures that the sum of the rst two terms is strictly
positive, this expression is indeed strictly positive. Q.E.D.
It is then clear that the application of iterative dominance leads to the desired con-
clusion.
Proposition 2 Under Conditions 1 and 2, a unique bid surviving iterative strict dom-
inance is bi = maxfvi   d;0g for each vi 2 f0;d;:::;1g.
4 Independent Distributions
DW also analyze the standard i.i.d. case, and demonstrate that if (i) players are sym-
metric, (ii) types are conditionally independent, and (iii) probability of each type is
non-zero, DW-1 and DW-2 hold for suciently large n (with respect to m). In this
section, we rst show that under the same assumptions, our conditions also hold. Then,
we drop the assumption of symmetry. Lastly, we show that if the distributions satisfy
DW-1 and DW-2, then they also satisfy our conditions as well.
4.1 Symmetric Case
Let p(v = d) be the probability that a player's type is d. Then, the dierence of the
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l   1: (10)














l   1 = (1 + )n 1   1:
























































where de is the ceiling function. Let n = maxfn() j  2 f0;1;:::;mgg. It is clear
that for any n  n, (11) is strictly positive, and hence so is (10).10 That is, for any
n  n, Condition 2 holds.



















Note that the rst term is the inverse hazard rate. From this, it is clear that if the
inverse hazard rate is high for each , n does not have to be large.
Example 2. Consider the following simple example in which types are independently
drawn from a unique distribution:
p(v = 0) =
1
3m







3 for  = 1;:::;m:
Note that for   1,









10We only need weak inequality because of the second term in (11).
10and hence
p(v  1) = 1:11










In this case, independent of m, n = 3 suces.
4.2 Asymmetric Case
For the left-hand side of Condition 2, the opponents are divided into two groups; (i)
those whose valuation is exactly d, and (ii) those whose valuations are strictly lower
than d. Let N i = Nnfig, 2N i be the power set of the opponents and N = 2N inf;g.
Let Nk 2 N be a typical element of N for k 2 f1;:::;jNjg where jNj = 2n 1   1. Let
pi() correspond to the distribution determining player i's valuation, which is commonly



















































pi(v  (   1)d)

;
we can apply the same arguments for the symmetric case to the current case. That is,
if the inverse hazard rate is suciently high for each valuation of each player, there is a
unique bid for each valuation even if n is small.
4.3 Comparison of Conditions
In this section, we show that given that the distributions are independent (and possibly
asymmetric), if they satisfy DW-1 and DW-2, they also satisfy Conditions 1 and 2. First,
given the assumption that probability of each type is non-zero, DW-1 and Condition 1
both hold.
11Remember that m = 1
d.
11Suppose now that DW-2 holds. That is, there exists  n such that for all n >  n, i and
, we have
pi(#fk 6= i s.t. vk = dg  mjvj  d for all j 6= i) <
1
n(m   1) + 1
:
Remember also that DW's condition implies n > m + 1.
Proposition 3 Suppose that valuations are independently distributed. If players' beliefs
satisfy DW-2, they also satisfy Condition 2.
Proof. Since pi(vj  d for all j 6= i) > 0, the expression in Condition 2 can be
rewritten with the form of conditional probabilities:
n 1 X
l=1





> pi(vk  (   1)d for all k 6= i j vj  d for all j 6= i): (13)
We show below that if DW-2 holds, (13) holds as well.
From the left-hand side expression in (13), we have
n 1 X
l=1

























[1   pi (#fk 6= i s.t. vk = dg  m j vj  d for all j 6= i)]



























n(m   1) + 1

where the last term corresponds to the lower bound for the left-hand side of (13).
Since m  2, from the right-hand side of (13), we have
pi(vk  (   1)d for all k 6= i j vj  d for all j 6= i)
12< pi(#fk s.t. vk = dg  m j vj  d for all j 6= i)
<
1
n(m   1) + 1
where the last inequality comes directly from DW-2. The last term gives the upper
bound for the right-hand side of (13).










n(m   1) + 1
:
Since n > m + 1, it suces to show
(m + 1)m(m   1) > m + 2 ) m3   2m   2 > 0:
This holds for any m  2. Q.E.D.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we show a set of conditions under which each player with valuation v
chooses b = maxfv   d;0g. Condition 2 in our study is dierent from DW-2. While
DW's result requires a suciently large n (relative to m), ours does not rely on this. For
the independent case, we show that n need not be necessarily large if the inverse hazard
rate is suciently high for each type. This also applies to the case in which distributions
are asymmetric. Moreover, if the distributions satisfy DW-2, they also satisfy Condition
2.
A Appendix
The rst part of the dominance arguments, which is identical to that of Dekel and
Wollinsky [4], identies the upper bound of bid for each type. The only dierence is
that we instead use Conditions 1 and 2 (and hence (2)). First, we show that bi  1   d
for any vi.
 For any vi 2 f0;:::;1   dg, bi = 1 is strictly dominated by bi = 0. This is
because the former guarantees a negative expected payo (with a positive chance
of winning) while the latter guarantees at least a payo of zero.
 For a player with vi = 1, bi = 1 is strictly dominated by bi = 1   d. For any state
in which vj  1   d for all j 6= i and hence the highest bids are 1   d, bi = 1 is
strictly dominated by bi = 1 d since the former guarantees a payo of zero while
13the latter gives a strictly positive payo. For any state in which there is player
j 6= i with vj = 1, bi = 1 is rather weakly dominated by bi = 1 d since the latter
does not win if an opponent with vj = 1 chooses bj = 1. Since the former class of
states happens with a positive probability (Equation (2)), the clam holds.
Take  2 f2;:::;mg. Suppose that for any vi  d, the remaining bids are bi 
(   1)d while for any vi > d, it is bi  vi   d. Then the arguments below show that
for any vi  (   1)d, (   1)d is strictly dominated. Note that for the case of vi = 0;d
we need to use Condition 1.
 For a player with vi  ( 2)d, bi = ( 1)d is strictly dominated by bi = 0. For
any state in which vj  d for all j 6= i, the highest possible bid is ( 1)d. Hence,
bi = ( 1)d gives a chance of winning, meaning a negative expected payo, while
bi = 0 provides a non-negative payos. For any state in which there exists vj > d,
dominance relationship is rather weak. Since Equation (2) implies that the former
states happen with a positive probability, our claim holds.12
 For a player with vi = ( 1)d, bi = ( 1)d is strictly dominated by bi = ( 2)d.
For any state in which vj  ( 2)d for j 6= i, the highest possible bid is ( 2)d.
The former guarantees a payo of zero while the latter gives a positive expected
payo. For any state in which there exists vj > d, dominance relationship is
rather weak. Since the former states happen with a positive probability (Equation
(2)), our claim holds.13
The repetition of the arguments above leads to the conclusion that, for each type
vi 2 V , any bi  vi does not survive iterative strict dominance except for vi = 0 whose
only surviving bid is bi = 0.
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